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ABSTRACT 
For welfare systems whose backing relies mainly on the tax revenues collected, tax non-
compliance is an issue of great importance. Concretely in the European Union, a 
considerable amount of tax revenue is lost in terms of VAT. This is the so-called VAT 
Gap, the term that stands for the difference between the VAT Total Tax Liability and the 
VAT revenue actually collected. In view of the importance of this matter, and of the lack of 
awareness of which factors affect such VAT non-compliance, this study aims to throw 
some light by means of an econometric model on whether or not shadow economy, 
decentralization, institutional quality, missing trader fraud, VAT standard rates, or the 
amount of 500 euro bills available each year for each member state affect the VAT Gap. 
To that purpose, the model will be based on panel data including information on those 
variables for the 28 Member States of the European Union and for the years 2012 to 2016. 
The main findings of the study are the following. First, higher institutional quality is found 
to affect negatively to the VAT Gap. Second, a higher fiscal decentralization appears to 
decrease significantly the VAT Gap. Third, higher amounts of 500 euro bills annually 
available increase such gap. Other variables checked do not appear to be significantly 
determinant of the VAT non-compliance in this model as can be seen in the results. 
 
KEYWORDS AND JEL 
VAT Gap; Shadow Economy, Quality of Government, Intra-Community trade, Tax 
Morale, Missing Trader Fraud. 
JEL: H20, H26. 
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1. INTRODUCTION: WHAT AFFECTS THE VAT GAP IN EUROPE? 
Awareness for the VAT revenue loss across the Europe has increased over the last years. 
The main reason for this is that when quantifying such loss, it amounts to an average of 
5,953 million euros in the European Union Member States. Thus, the European 
Commission has been tasking a yearly study of the VAT Gap in each country and in all 
Europe.  
These reports provide estimates of the VAT Gap for the EU Member States since 2013, 
which was first conducted by Barbone et al. in 2013, and updated there on. The latest 
version was published in 2018 and contains data of 2016. The VAT Gap addressed in detail 
by those reports, refer to the differences between the expected and actual VAT revenues. It 
is defined as the difference between the amount of VAT collected and the VAT Total Tax 
Liability (VTTL) and, apart from fraud and evasion and their associated policy measures, it 
also represents VAT lost due to insolvencies, bankruptcies, administrative errors, and legal 
tax optimization. 
Although detailed information on the measurement procedure of the VAT Gap is available 
therein, no econometric model testing for the variables determining such Gap was carried 
out until the latest version. 
When trying to expla.in the VAT Gap along the EU Members, they proved substantial 
differences in their levels and that enhanced the interest of this paper on showing whether 
or not some variables – i.e. quality of institutions, the shadow economy, fiscal 
decentralization levels, or the amount of 500 euro bills available annually) – could 
determine the size of the VAT Gap across EU Member States. 
This study focuses exclusively on the 28 Member States of the European Union in the 
period of 2012 to 2016 
The main findings of the study are the following. First, higher institutional quality is found 
to affect negatively to the VAT Gap. Second, a higher fiscal decentralization appears to 
decrease significantly the VAT Gap. Third, higher amounts of 500 euro-bills annually 
available increase such gap. Other variables checked do not appear to be significantly 
determinant of the VAT non-compliance in this model as can be seen in the results. 
The reminder of the paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the theoretical framework 
is discussed. In Section 3, the relevant literature on VAT gap and some variables that might 
determine it is discussed. Section 4 presents the data and hypothesis utilized. Then, the 
empirical model and estimations are presented in Section 5 and finally findings and policy 
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applications are addressed in Section 6. Bibliography can be found in Section 7 and further 
information in the Appendix. 
2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Value-added tax (VAT) is a kind of tax which is assessed incrementally, based on the 
value-increase of products or services in every stage of their production or distribution. It 
was first implemented by Germany and France as a general consumption tax during World 
War I. This tribute basically finances the services and infrastructure a certain government 
level may provide for its citizens. Thus, taxpayers get, in a way, public goods and services in 
exchange for their contributions; nevertheless, in legal systems that choose to implement 
VAT, its payment is compulsory, no matter what public goods or services the taxpayer may 
receive afterwards. 
This tax is generally implemented as a destination-based tax, that is: basing the tax rate on 
the location of the consumer and applying it as a percentage of the sales‟ final price.  
Although VAT system is not applied in every state, it is in almost every country that has 
full UN membership. 
Two main methods exist to calculate VAT: the invoice-based method or credit-invoice 
method, and the accounts or subtraction-based method. The first method is the most 
widely used method. It leads to the taxation of sales transactions with the customer 
informed of the VAT at the time of the transaction; business might after consuming be 
recipient of a credit for the VAT paid on input goods or services. Regarding the second 
method, the subtraction method, business calculate the value of all taxable sales after each 
reporting period and afterwards subtract the sum of all taxable purchases. The VAT rate is 
then applied to the difference. The invoice-based method is the one used in the European 
member states. 
The value-added effect is achieved by banning final consumers from recovering VAT on 
purchases, but allowing businesses to do so. Final consumers do not only pay for the VAT 
of the final product but also for the VAT of the entire production process because this tax 
is always included in the price of each stage in the production chain. 
Regarding the different ways of implementing the VAT, two issues must be taken into 
account: the method of collection and the timing of collection. Regarding the  way of 
collecting of this tax, two approaches exist: the invoice-based method and the accounts-
based method. Under the first approach, sellers charge VAT on their output and gives the 
buyer a special invoice where the VAT amount charged is indicated. Therefore, buyers that 
are subject to output tax consider the tax on purchase invoices as input tax and afterwards 
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deduct them from their VAT liability. According to this method, depending on whether the 
difference between output and input tax is positive or negative, it is paid to, or refunded by 
the tax authorities each time the reporting period comes to an end. Under the second 
approach, the accounts based-method, no specific invoices are used; alternatively, the tax 
amount is calculated on the value added itself, measured as the difference between 
revenues and allowable purchases. The later method is by far the least common one, only 
used in Japan as mentioned above. Regarding the timing of collection, VAT, in line with 
accounting, can be either accrual or cash based. 
Although VAT method seems to be easy and cheap, and an effective way to finance public 
goods and services, it also has some counterparts as any other intervention in the free 
market. It increases prices and consequently decreases the quantity of goods traded, 
resulting in a grater lost due to supply and demand shifts than the gain obtained from it 
and leading to the so-called deadweight loss. Nevertheless, this system relies on the fact 
that the total utility increase surpasses the total utility decrease. This does not imply that 
there is many people that are worse off by more than tax authorities are better off by it, but 
if the income lost due to VAT were greater than the tax authorities‟ income coming from 
it, this system would be inefficient and governments should rethink its use.  
Regarding its compliance, there is some trouble in fulfilling the task of getting to collect 
what actually corresponds. This is due to many factors. Mainly fraud and tax evasion 
because, as previously stated, there are people who are better off without the VAT system 
and therefore have many incentives to avoid compliance. Also insolvencies, administrative 
errors, and legal tax optimization are responsible for the non-collected VAT which is 
measured by the VAT Gap. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
VAT system is the basis of a self-enforcement mechanism where consumers have 
incentives to charge the tax in order to afterwards get back the money paid in terms of 
input taxes. This is the reason why the literature defines VAT as a “money machine” (Keen 
and Lockwood, 2006) Nevertheless, this same rule does not apply to final consumers since 
they are not allowed to deduct the input tax and therefore have incentives to evade taxes. If 
these incentives were to make the final consumer commit a non-compliance crime, he/she 
would need to be accomplices with the retailer so that no VAT was charged at all. 
The VAT Gap, which will be addressed in this study, represents more than just fraud and 
evasion, it also covers VAT lost due to, for example: insolvencies, bankruptcies, 
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administrative errors, and legal tax optimization. It is a phenomenon that takes place as a 
result of tax noncompliance for different motives.  
In line with the purpose of this study, which is to reveal whether or not variables such as 
shadow economy, Institutional Quality, de-centralization, Community acquisitions, and stock of EUR 500 
bills are determinants of the VAT Gap in EU Member States, a review of the literature 
might be helpful to understand how these variables are measured and the conclusions other 
authors have come to.  
3.1 Main variable – VAT Gap 
VAT Gap 
This subsection contains a review of the literature that has been considered of upmost 
relevance on VAT Gap. 
The VAT Gap is a measure of tax non-compliance. The European Commission has been 
publishing studies and reports on its size in the EU Member States. This study was first 
conducted by Barbone et al. in 2013, and its latest version is the Study and Reports on the 
VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States: 2018 Final Report, which was carried out by a team of 
experts from CASE (Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw) and IEB 
(Barcelona Institute of Economics) and coordinated by the IHS (Institute for Advanced 
Studies). 
The concept of VAT Gap has been measured therein as the difference between the VAT 
Total Tax Liability (VTTL) (sometimes addressed as VAT Total Theoretical Tax Liability) 
according to the tax law and the actual VAT revenue collected.  
Throughout these studies and reports on the VAT Gap in the EU Member States, VTTL 
has been computed by deriving the expected VAT liability from the observed national 
accounts data, such as supply and use tables (SUT). Concretely, VAT liability has been 
estimated for final household, government, and Non Profit Institutions Serving 
Households (NPISH) expenditures; non-deductible VAT from intermediate consumption 
of exempt industries; and VAT from Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) of exempt 
sectors. Furthermore, also country-specific tax regulations such as exemptions for small 
business under the VAT thresholds; non-deductible business expenditures on good, drinks 
and accommodation; and restrictions to deduct VAT on leased cars were taken into 
account.  
As the quality and availability of SUT data varied greatly country by country and year by 
year, the authors of these reports estimated some missing expenditure and investment 
figures which were not available by using industry- and sector-specific growth rates and 
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taxable shares. This has led to a subsequent need of frequent revision of previous estimates 
whenever actual national accounts data has been published or new information on taxable 
investment became available.   
The latest version of these Reports has concluded that, in nominal terms, in 2016, the VAT 
Gap in EU-28 Member States fell below EUR 150 billion and amounted to EUR 147.1 
billion. The estimated VTTL was of EUR 1,194.4 billion, whereas the VAT revenue was of 
EUR 1,047.3 billion. These numbers can be translated to relative terms as: a VAT Gap 
share of 12.3 percent of the VTTL, the lowest value in the analyzed period of 2012-2016. 
Along the EU-28 Member States, the VAT Gap share decreased in 22 countries and 
increased in six – concretely, Romania, Finland, the UK, Ireland, Estonia, and France –. 
The smallest Gaps were observed in Luxembourg, Sweden, and Croatia whereas the largest 
were found in Romania, Greece, and Italy. Table 1.1 ranks the five members with the 
largest and smallest VAT Gap in 2016.  
Table 1. Five largest and smallest VAT Gaps in EU, 2016 (relative terms) 
COUNTRY VAT GAP (%)* 
LARGEST 
Romania 35.88% 
Greece 29.22% 
Italy 25.9% 
Slovakia 25.68% 
Lithuania 24.52% 
SMALLEST 
Luxemburg 0.85% 
Sweden 1.08% 
Croatia 1.15% 
Spain 2.71% 
Malta 2.71% 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131;  
* VAT Gap (%) stands for the VAT Gap in terms as a share of VTTL. 
 
Addressing the VAT Gap issue and the factors that enhance it is of vital interest for 
authorities since great recollection is lost through it. Measures are being taken and they are 
slowly might be showing their fruits as it can be seen in Figure 1.1, which shows a negative 
trend of the increase in the period 2012-2016.  
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Figure 1 VAT Gap percentage increase in EU, 2015-2016 
 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131, own calculations 
 
Concretely, latest data available is shown in the figures below. Figure 2.1. represents the 
VAT Gap as a percentage of the VTTL for each member state in the years 2015 and 2016. 
Probably the most striking aspect of this figure is how big the variability of the gap is 
across countries. This should be a good-enough reason to go deeper on the factors that 
might affect VAT non-compliance in the different European Member States and 
afterwards try to mitigate the problem once knowing its real causes.  
Figure 2.1 VAT Gap estimates, 2015 and 2016 (relative terms) 
 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131 
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Figure 2.2., which shows the percentage point change in VAT Gap from 2015 to 2016 for 
each Member State, shows that, despite the trend of the gap seems to be decreasing, this 
statement does not hold true for every member state. Six countries‟ VAT Gap increased 
from 2015 to 2016. Namely, Romania, Finland, United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia and 
France, ordered from greater to smaller increase in VAT non-compliance.  
On the other side, from those who had a decreasing VAT gap, Bulgaria, Latvia, Cyprus, 
and the Netherlands stand out as those with the larger increase, being this, in all cases, 
larger than 0.05 points. 
Figure 2.2 Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap from year 2015 to 2016 
 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131 
In the last report, an econometric analysis of VAT Gap determinants was included for the 
first time in this series of reports. Among the explanatory variables taken into account, the 
unemployment rate; a country variable of government effectiveness; and of age structure 
could be found.  Furthermore, as they wished to include the productive structure of each 
country, the following sectors were inserted as explanatory variables too: retail, real estate, 
construction, industry, telecommunications, and art. The sum of all these sectors amounted 
to a 100 once sectors not subject or exempted from VAT had been excluded. As VAT tax 
rates do not change frequently, they took the dispersion of tax rates within a country to 
control. Moreover, to infer the impact of the tax administration, they employed variables 
that promote voluntary tax compliance – namely, the scale of the Tax Administration; the 
Information and Technology Expenditure; and the Public Deficit. Finally, as further 
controls in all regressions, population and GDP per capita were included. See 
TAXUD/2015/CC/131 for more detail. 
  
-8,00%
-6,00%
-4,00%
-2,00%
0,00%
2,00%
R
O FI U
K IE EE FR EL S
I IT A
T
M
T LT D
E
B
E ES LU H
U D
K SE P
T
C
Z
H
R P
L
SK N
L
C
Y LV B
G
Percentage Point Change in VAT Gap, 2015 and 2016 
12 
 
3.2 Possible determinants of the VAT Gap 
3.2.1. Shadow economy  
The number of studies investigating underground economy have strongly increased in the 
last decades. This topic is of extreme relevance as it explains tax revenue losses Member 
States have to deal with. Nonetheless, the fact that it has been more and more studied does 
not at all imply that it is a simple matter. In fact, obtaining accurate information is not even 
possible because, due to its illegitimate nature, individuals taking part in the informal sector 
try not to be discovered and thus, all information is based on estimations which, of better 
or worse quality, are still estimations. 
Vast literature on Shadow Economy can be found. Schneider and Buehn (2012a) claim 
that, even if the size of the shadow economy and of tax evasion are not congruent, 
activities in the shadow economy often imply the evasion of direct or indirect taxes, so that 
factors affecting tax evasion will very likely affect the shadow economy too.  
Schneider (2005 a) states that “the shadow economy contains all market-based legal production of goods 
and services that are deliberately concealed from public authorities with the aim of avoiding payment of 
income, value added or other taxes and social security contributions; certain labor market standards, such as 
minimum wages, maximum working hours, or safety standards, and compliance with certain administrative 
procedures.” 
Decentralization, tax morale and institution quality have been popular the most studied 
variables when trying to explain shadow economy. Results have shown that 
decentralization has an ambiguous effect as deeply explained below, and tax morale, and 
the institutional quality level appeared to have a negative effect. See Buehn et al. in 2011, 
for more detail.  
3.2.2. Decentralization  
The variable of de-centralization has widely been analyzed as a potential determinant of the 
shadow economy. Oates (1972), argued in his Decentralization Theorem that decentralizing the 
supply of public goods and services lead to social benefits such as a more efficient 
provision due to better knowledge of its citizens‟ preferences and, therefore, better 
satisfaction. This aspect is of supreme importance because, despite paying taxes does not 
formally entitle to direct benefits, part of what determines if taxpayers act dutifully or not 
depends on whether or not they get back what they consider a fair share of the taxes they 
pay. Through decentralizing the supply of public goods and services, and therefore getting 
to know better residents‟ preferences, a better match of what is supplied and what 
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taxpayers consider a fair share of the taxes could be achieved. This would undoubtedly lead 
to a higher degree of honorability of contribution duties. 
Furthermore, decentralization brings the government closer to the people and hence, the 
task of monitoring and surveillance improves, what results in an increasing likelihood of 
detection and punishment of tax noncompliance. This increase in governments‟ efficiency 
subsequently decreases shadow economy and increases tax morale and social intervention. 
(Allingham and Sandmo, 1972). 
Other researchers (see Torgler et al. 2010) have added that the efficiency following 
decentralization also increases the acceptance for state interventions and the tax morale of 
those conforming that system.  
Unsurprisingly, this approach has had critiques because it is not believed that financial 
considerations of enforcement are enough to explain compliance behavior (Webley et al. 
1991). In fact, were this to be the only consideration, given the relatively low rates of audits 
and fines taxpayers face, no income would be reported. For this reason, further analysis 
should be carried out to explain what motivates taxpayers to fulfill their duty. 
Decentralizing also embodies a counterpart of negative effects that leave room for the 
uncertainty of which the final impact on the degree of tax compliance will be. Coordination 
problems or interjurisdictional spillovers are examples of the negative effects that may arise 
due to decentralization and lower the marginal costs of acting in the unofficial part of the 
economy (Prud‟homme, 1995. 
Regarding the methods used to measure Fiscal Decentralization, many papers have used 
the revenue approach. Concretely, in an experimental study carried out by Werner et al., 
(2004), tax morale was proven to be definitely lower in cases where taxes were spent 
centrally than in cases those where they were spent sub-centrally. Furthermore, Barone and 
mocetti (2011) investigated the link between the inefficiency (which increases with 
centralization) of public spending and tax morale and found that there was a negative 
effect. Therefore, more efficiency is thought to lead to more tax morale. 
3.2.3 Tax morale 
Despite some scholars have assumed that the extent of tax evasion is negatively correlated 
with the probability of detection and the degree of punishment (Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972), others argued that the choice between tax compliance and evasion does not only 
result from sanctions but also from a set of attitudes and norms (Spicer and Lundstedt 
(1974). 
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Many papers have been written with the aim of trying to find out the reasons why people 
fulfill or not the duty they have with their corresponding tax authorities. In this field, the 
concept of tax morale is in vogue. The term was coined by Schmölders back in 1960, who 
defined it as “the attitude of a group or the whole population of taxpayers regarding the 
question of accomplishment or neglect of their tax duties” (Schmölders, 1960). Since then, 
it has been victim of the attribution of different definitions and names: “internalized 
obligation to pay tax” (Feld and Frey (2002), Braithwaite and Ahmed (2005), “intrinsic 
motivation” (Alm and Torgler (2006). Others related the term to a civic duty (Orviska and 
Hudson (2002), or renamed it as taxpayer ethics: “the norms of behavior governing citizens 
as taxpayers in their relationship with the government” (Song and Yarbrough, 1978). 
A widely spread paradigm for analyzing tax compliance behavior was developed by 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), who applied the general theory of 
criminal behavior first evolved by Becker (1968). It is the so-called “economics-of-crime 
paradigm” and views the decision of whether or not to pay taxes as an individual choice 
between two lotteries. The first consists of the sure option of paying taxes and the second 
implies the risky choice of evading taxes. Through this paradigm, tax compliance is 
understood as the result of a rational „portfolio‟ decision by a single taxpayer. Here is when 
efficiency provided by de-centralization takes place. The first choice, as mentioned before, 
provides the government with the necessary tools to better monitor its citizens and 
therefore increases their probability of detection and punishment in case of fraud. In terms 
of this rational „portfolio‟ decision, this alternative can be translated into an increase in the 
marginal cost of infringing and, therefore, into a decrease in the probability of entering the 
unofficial economy. However, it is widely thought that in the concrete context of tax 
compliance, an intrinsic motivation exists to economically contribute to societies through 
tax paying (Frey 1994, 1997) and thus, that not only financial considerations should be 
taken into account to understand tax compliance. For this reason, the “economics-of-
crime” paradigm shall not be considered a „formula‟ to explain compliance behavior. 
As it appeared to Pommerehne et al. in 1994, the main challenge of tax morale is that it 
cannot be measured directly. It can only be assessed by looking at its effects. In any case, 
this does not doubt its importance when it comes to the explanation of tax compliance. 
Surveys take an important role in eliciting and analyzing tax morale.  
Alm and Torgler (2006) investigated the simple correlation between tax morale and the size 
of the shadow economy in Europe and the United States and found a strong negative 
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correlation, what means that an increase in tax morale increases shadow economy. 
Significant differences across European countries were found in that study. 
Alm and MCClellan (2012) studied the effect of tax morale on tax compliance behavior and 
their reported results show that tax morale considerations are the same for firms and 
individuals. Dell‟ Anno (2009) showed that tax morale could account for the level of 
aggregate tax evasion and that depended on taxpayers‟ inner attitudes toward honesty and 
social stigma. Torgler et al (2008) found a significant correlation between tax evasion and 
tax morale after controlling factors such as tax administration, tax system and the perceived 
tax burden, tax awareness, compliance perceptions, trust in authorities and other citizens, 
corruption, willingness to obey the law, and religiosity. 
3.2.4. Institutional quality 
Institutional quality of governments has gained popularity for its effects on both the 
magnitude of the informal sector that countries have, and the tax ethics their taxpayers 
present. Bird et al., (2006) already stated that not only the economic but also de political 
system affect formal and informal economic activities. In fact, it has already been showed 
that improving social institutions decreases the incentives for firms to go underground. 
(Torgler and Schneider, 2009).  
Quality of Governance has been widely used as a proxy of institutional quality. 
Lack/control of corruption, the strength of the rule of law, and bureaucratic quality (also 
referred to as government effectiveness) have been proved to be its most measurable 
components. Due to the existent high correlation among these cross-country indicators, 
comparative scholars thought of a term that would encompass all the indicators: “quality of 
government” (QoG). Rothstein and Teorell (2008) defined this concept as an impartial, 
efficient and non-corrupt government.  
Charron et al., 2010 revealed that there is a significant variation among many of the 
member states‟ institutional quality in the EU. They found that the World Bank‟s „World 
Governance Indicators‟ (WGI) (Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 2009)  data would be the 
most appropriate source on which to build an indicator of QoG for EU Members. 
3.2.5. Missing Trader fraud 
The Missing Trader Fraud, is also known as Intra-Community (MTIC) or Carousel Fraud.  
It consists of the theft of VAT from a government through a muti-jurisdictional trading 
where transactions take place in VAT-free jurisdictions that allow the thieve to charge VAT 
on goods sold and, instead of giving the corresponding output-VAT revenue in to the 
collection authority, the trader goes missing.  
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A subtle difference exists in the terms used to coin VAT fraud of this kind. It relies on how 
complex the structure and process to defraud is. While the term “Missing Trader fraud” 
would stand for the basic procedure just explained, the term “Carousel fraud” would do so 
for a more complex strategy that keeps going round and round as a carousel. It may take 
different forms and sizes, but the essential issue is basically the same: no VAT is chargeable 
on cross-border transactions between the UE-Member States and this provides an 
opportunity to commit fraud as it will be explained. 
VAT fraud is one of the nine EMPACT priorities, the European Union‟s priority crime 
areas. Europol‟s Analysis Project MTIC‟s objective consists, among others, on the 
identification and dismantling of organized criminal networks involved in cross-border 
VAT fraud. The total figure of the MTIC VAT Gap in 2014 was of EUR 94 billion, 
representing the 0.67% of the EU-28 GDP. 
Actually, MTIC is the most common form of VAT fraud as the Europol states. It involves 
organized, sophisticated activities that aim to exploit differences in VAT treatments along 
EU Member States. A structure of linked companies is created by criminals across states 
and then both national and international trading and revenue-accounting procedures are 
abused. 
This crime aims to wring out current harmonized VAT system. It relies in a transitional 
VAT regime for intra-Community supplies of goods in which VAT is applied only to sales 
within a Member State at the applicable domestic rate and allows VAT-free trading across 
Member State borders. It enables traders to import goods without directly accounting for 
the VAT. In plain MTIC cases, fraudsters sell the goods, charge the VAT to buyers, and do 
not remit that value to Commissioners. 
Cases of VAT fraud with greater complexity are better known as carousel fraud cases. 
Here, goods are imported and sold by a series of companies before they are exported again. 
The first company in the domestic chain, the „missing trader‟, charges VAT to a customer 
but does not pay it to the tax authorities. Exporters of the goods claim and receive 
reimbursement of VAT payments that did not effectively happen. Missing traders usually 
operate only some months and afterwards disappear.  
In this study, the amount of intra-community transactions will be considered relevant due 
to the assumption that more intra-community transactions increase the probability of 
existence of MTIC fraud that, undoubtedly, affects the VAT Gap in the European Member 
States.  
  
17 
 
4. DATA AND HYPOTHESIS 
4.1 VAT Gap 
VAT Gap, which is the explanatory variable in this paper, has been studied in detail in the 
“Study and Reports on the VAT Gap in the EU-28 Member States” carried on for the 
European Commission as mentioned before. 
In these reports, available since 2013, authors present the VAT Gap estimates for years 
2012-2016. These were the data source for this study. Therein, VAT Gap is measured as 
the difference between the amount of VAT collected and the VAT Total Tax Liability 
(VTTL) –namely, the tax liability according to tax law. Data used for this paper‟s model will 
be expressed as a ratio of the VTTL: 
        
                
    
 
Where VTTL is computed by deriving the expected VAT liability from the observed 
national accounts data, such as supply and use tables (SUT). Concretely, VAT liability has 
been estimated for final household, government, and Non Profit Institutions Serving 
Households (NPISH) expenditures; non-deductible VAT from intermediate consumption 
of exempt industries; and VAT from Gross Fixed Capital Formation (GFCF) of exempt 
sectors. 
Regarding the VAT revenue, it can be expressed as the product of three components:  Net 
base, Effective rate, and Compliance Gap: 
 
                                                       
 
Table 2.1. Shows data on the revenues, the VTTL, and the VAT Gap in million euros and 
the VAT Gap expressed as a percentage of the VTTL for year 2016. The same tables for 
previous years can be found in tables A.1. - A.4 in the Appendix. 
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Table 2. VAT Gap estimates, 2016 (EUR million) 
Countries Codes Revenues VTTL VAT Gap 
VAT Gap 
(%)* 
Belgium BE 28722 31801 3079 9,68% 
Bulgaria BG 4417 5110 693 13,56% 
Czech Republic CZ 13091 15256 2165 14,19% 
Denmark DK 26519 28985 2466 8,51% 
Germany DE 218784 241463 22679 9,39% 
Estonia EE 1974 2118 144 6,78% 
Ireland IE 12826 14436 1610 11,15% 
Greece EL 14333 20249 5916 29,22% 
Spain ES 70591 72557 1966 2,71% 
France FR 154430 175326 20896 11,92% 
Croatia HR 6016 6086 70 1,15% 
Italy IT 102957 138945 35988 25,90% 
Cyprus CY 1664 1746 83 4,73% 
Latvia LV 2032 2290 258 11,27% 
Lithuania LT 3026 4009 983 24,52% 
Luxemburg LU 3416 3445 29 0,85% 
Hungary HU 10587 12216 1629 13,33% 
Malta MT 729 749 20 2,71% 
Netherlands NL 48557 50581 2024 4,00% 
Austria AT 27300 29449 2149 7,30% 
Poland PL 30479 38483 8004 20,80% 
Portugal PT 15770 17554 1784 10,16% 
Romania RO 10968 17105 6137 35,88% 
Slovenia SI 3315 3604 290 8,04% 
Slovakia SK 5420 7292 1872 25,68% 
Finland FI 19694 21401 1707 7,98% 
Sweden SE 42770 43236 465 1,08% 
United 
Kingdom 
UK 166866 188906 22040 11,67% 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131; *VAT Gap (%) stands for the VAT Gap in terms as a share of VTTL. 
 
In nominal terms, the greater VAT Gap that can be appreciated for year 2016 is of 35988 
million euros and it is Italian legacy; the smallest VAT Gap amounts to 20 million euros 
and corresponds to Malta. In relative terms, the highest value is for Romania (35.88%) 
whereas the lowest one can be attributed to Luxemburg (0.85%). 
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Once again, VAT-compliance gaps, either in nominal or relative terms, differ substantially 
among the European Member States; it may be due to their particularities in economical 
and social situations.   
4.2 Shadow economy 
Shadow economy (SE) has been estimated through different methodologies that can be 
divided into direct or indirect. Although this study focused on indirect approaches, four 
direct micro approaches are worth mentioning: 
4.2.1 Discrepancy Method (Measurement by the System of National Accounts Statistics) 
4.2.2 Survey technique approach 
4.2.3 Surveys of company managers 
4.2.4 Estimation of the consumption-income-gap of households 
Although the methodologies explained above have widely been used, due to the macro-
vision of this study, indirect macro approaches, also named “indicator” approaches, would 
suit better.  
Five methodologies should be outlined, and some details given so as to understand why the 
MIMIC model explained below was thought to be the best for this study‟s purposes. They 
are: 
4.2.1. Discrepancy between national expenditure and income statistics: 
This approach assumes that there is no error in the measurement of elements 
composing the expenditure side and that they are constructed in a way that they are 
independent from income factors, which is not easily plausible. 
4.2.2 Discrepancy between official and actual labor force: 
This method consists of assuming a constant labor force participation and therefore, 
categorizing as an increase in the shadow economy every decrease in the official labor force 
participation. It does not control other variables affecting the fluctuation in the labor force, 
what makes it a weak indicator of the shadow economy. 
4.2.3. Electricity approach:  
This methodology was developed in detail by Kaufmann and Kaliberda, 1996.34 Some 
findings had shown that electricity-overall GDP elasticity is close to one; these authors 
took this as a basis and suggested that differences between the growth of these two 
variables, – namely electricity consumption and official GDP, were a good proxy to 
measure variations in the shadow economy.  
Though appealing, the electricity approach has some counterparts. Not all unofficial 
activities forming part of the shadow economy use electricity. Furthermore, the basis for 
20 
 
this method, that is, the close-to-one electricity-overall GDP elasticity might not be 
constant across countries or over time. 
4.2.4. Currency demand approach (CDA): 
This approach assumes that unofficial transactions are carried out in cash and that, 
therefore, an increase in the estimated size of the shadow economy will lead to a 
subsequent increase in the demand for cash. This method‟s counterparts are, for example, 
that the money demand does not only depend on whether an individual wants or not to 
leave a trace the transactions for the authorities. Moreover, concluding that the means of 
payment financing the shadow economy is always cash would underestimate the size of the 
unofficial sector. 
4.2.5. Multiple Indicators, Multiple Causes (MIMIC) approach: 
This method takes many causes and effects of the shadow economy. It associates the 
observable causes and effects of an unobserved variable to estimate the variable itself 
(Loayza, 1996). It is considered a confirmatory model rather than an explanatory one 
because it is a theory-based approach useful to confirm the influence exogenous causal 
variables may have on the dependent variable, as well as the effect of the latest on different 
macroeconomic indicator variables. Many consider this method the most complex and 
significant one. 
Due to the challenges presented by indirect methods 3.2.1. to 3.2.4., when measuring the 
shadow economy, and for the higher precision of indirect method 3.2.5 for that same 
purpose, the estimation of the shadow economy‟s size carried out through a MIMIC Model 
by Leandro Medina and Friedrich Schneider, 2018, was thought to be the most reliable for 
this study. 
As the VAT Gap stands for the VAT that has not been paid and none of the unofficial 
transactions forming part of the underground economy pay VAT, an increase in the 
shadow economy could be expected to affect positively the VAT Gap. See Figure 3. 
Core hypothesis H1. A higher level of shadow economy increases the size of the VAT 
Gap, ceteris paribus. 
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Figure 3. Shadow Economy – VAT Gap relationship, 2012-2016 
 
Source: IMF, own calculations. 
4.3 Fiscal decentralization 
Fiscal decentralization can be calculated from the International Monetary Fund‟s (IMF) 
Government Finance Statistics (GFS). Those measures contain the degree of expenditure 
decentralization and tax revenue decentralization that are used in this study. Therein, tax 
revenue ratio is computed as the share of a given level of government (central, state, 
province, region, or local) tax revenues to general government tax revenue; and the 
expenditure decentralization ratio captures the share of expenditures (i.e. the sum of 
expense and net investment in nonfinancial assets) of the different levels of government as 
a proportion of overall government spending. 
In this study, with the aim of having a variable of fiscal decentralization that embraced 
both the tax revenue and the expenditure decentralization all together, an average of the 
two ratios was carried on, as shown in the equation below: 
 
   
 
 
                             
 
 
                             
 
Intuitively, the larger the Decentralization variable‟s values, the more independent sub-
central governments are in each of the analyzed Member State. 
When focusing on decentralization issues, some scholars agree that an economic 
decentralization does not concede autonomy to sub-central governments if they do not 
have the competences to decide where to collect from and spend on. For this reason, this 
study developed an additional variable in order to measure a decentralization that embraced 
the autonomy of regional governments. To that end, data on Economic Self Rule data was 
gathered from Jason Sorens‟ (2014) the empirical analysis for the 28-Member States and the 
decentralization variable taken into account before was multiplied by this value: 
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As explained by other authors (see literature review), the effect of fiscal decentralization is 
ambiguous because of both its positive and negative effects on the effectiveness of the 
government. Nevertheless, one could hope that, the positive effects are greater and 
therefore, that the more fiscally decentralized a country, the smaller the VAT Gap; thus, 
one could expect for the relationship between the Fiscal Decentralization and the VAT 
Gap to be negative (See Figure 4). This could apply to both decentralization variables – 
namely the one that takes account countries‟ self-rule into account and the one that focuses 
on simple fiscal decentralization. The differences in the result of their relations will show 
whether or not the degree of self-rule affects the VAT Gap. 
Core hypothesis H2.1: The higher the Fiscal Decentralization of the Member State, the 
lower its VAT Gap, ceteris paribus. 
Core hypothesis H2.2: The higher the Fiscal Decentralization considering the degree of 
self-rule of the Member State, the lower its VAT Gap, ceteris paribus. 
 
Figure 4 Fiscal Decentralization – VAT Gap relationship, 2012-2016 
 
Source: IMF, own calculations 
 
4.4 Tax morale 
In the last two waves –namely Wave 5 (2004-2009) and Wave 6 (2010-2014), the World 
Values Survey has included a question “justifiable to cheat on taxes if you have the chance” 
with the aim of measuring the tax morale of individuals. Nevertheless, this information is 
only available for 13-Member States (i.e. Cyprus, Estonia, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, 
Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and does not 
cover the time period targeted by this study (i.e. 2012-2016). For these reasons, the variable 
Tax Morale will not be taken in the model. Nevertheless, the data has been added to the 
Appendix, see Table A5, and A6. 
Although, Tax Morale variable will not be taken into account in this model, one could 
expect that a higher tax morale would decrease the VAT Gap, ceteris paribus, that is, a 
negative relation between these variables. 
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4.5 Institutional Quality  
As widely done before in the literature, the Quality of Governance (QoG) Index will be 
used in this study as a key proxy for institutional quality (see Kaufmann, Kraay, & 
Mastruzzi, 2009); concretely, the European Quality of Government Index (EQI). 
The EQI index is the result of novel survey data on regional level governance within the 28 
members of the EU and two accession countries (Serbia and Turkey) and was first 
assembled and published in 2010 and subsequently in 2013 and 2017. It focuses on both 
perceptions towards, and the experiences with the public sector‟s corruption; and, in 
addition, to the extent to which residents believe that public services are of good quality 
and impartially allocated. It is based on the largest regionally-focused survey to date. 
As mentioned above, data are available for years 2010, 2013, and 2017. For the purposes of 
analyzing what the effect of this variable is in the VAT Gap, data was needed for years 
2012-2016 and therefore, the EQUI Index provided by the Quality of Government 
Institute had to be extrapolated. 
As commented in the literature review, some scholars argue that, the better the public 
services match the individual preferences‟ of citizens, the less incentives will these persons 
have for acting in the underground economy.  
With this in mind, a negative relation could be expected from the variables Institutional 
Quality and VAT Gap. 
Core hypothesis H3: The higher the Institutional Quality, the lower the VAT Gap, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Figure 5. Quality of Government – VAT relationship 
 
Source: Quality of Government Institute, own calculations. 
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4.6 Missing Trader Fraud 
As stated before, this fraud may take different forms and sizes, but the essential issue is 
indeed the same: no VAT is chargeable on cross-border transactions between the UE-
Member States. This enhances the incentives to obtaining profits from avoiding taxation. 
In order to control the potential impact the Missing Trader Intra-Community Fraud might 
have in the VAT Gap, and taking into account the intuition that, more intra-community 
trade among members might provide a higher likelihood of the fraud to be carried out, a 
variable called intra-community trade will be essential in this study. 
Intra-community trade (In_Trade) variable will be defined as the sum of two ratios:  
(i) Ratio of intra-community exports to GDP 
 
   
                       
   
 
 
(ii) Ratio of intra-community-imports to GDP 
 
   
                       
   
 
 
Resulting in: 
               
 
Data for the composition of these ratios is available in Eurostat. Intra-community exports 
and imports in million euros and GDP at market prices. 
Core hypothesis H4: The more intra-community trade, the larger the VAT Gap, ceteris 
paribus. 
 
Figure 6. Intra-Community trade – VAT Gap relationship 
 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations 
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4.7 VAT Standard rate: 
A few countries applied changes to standard VAT rates, but in general, VAT rates were 
relatively stable in comparison with how variable they were during the Great Recession 
period in 2008-2009. Nevertheless, any change in countries‟ VAT rates affects the VTTL 
and might therefore affect the VAT Gap. This study will focus only on the standard VAT 
rate as it is the most applicable one.  
The variable used for the purpose of capturing the changes in the standard VAT rates 
during the years in question (VAT std) simply contains the different standard rates of those 
years. The European Commission makes available data on annual VAT standard rates per 
Member State. Therein, an increasing trend of the rates can be seen for the period in 
question. Some member states have maintained their rates whereas others have increased it 
(i.e. Cyprus, Czech Republic, Finland, France, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Slovenia, and Spain). 
As for the effect of this variable in the VAT Gap, one could expect that all those 
contributors that decide not to pay VAT in order to save money will have more reasons to 
continue to do so in the case of an increasing VAT rate. Therefore, one could a priori think 
of a positive relation between these two variables. 
Core hypothesis H5: The greater the VAT Standard Rate, the larger the VAT Gap, ceteris 
paribus. 
Figure 7. Standard VAT rate – VAT Gap relationship 
 
Source: European Commission 
3.8 Money 
As the most valuable bills in the Euro currency, 500 euro-bills undoubtedly attract 
attention. There is a lot of economic value put in a 160 x 82 mm size, and approximately 
2.25 grams-paper which is easy to carry and hide. For this reason and the fact that, as 
opposed to credit cards, it leaves no trace, it is widely thought to be a usual means of 
payment in the informal sector of the economy, which contributes to the VAT non-
compliance. A negative relation could be expected. 
26 
 
This argument has proved to be motive enough to include in the model a variable that 
intended to capture the amount of 500 euro-bills owned by each European Member State‟s 
citizens in the years 2012-2016. 
Regarding the source of the data for this variable, the European Central Bank (ECB) 
publishes statistical data on outstanding amounts (stocks) of euro banknotes and coins in 
circulation. Information on the annual amount of 500 euro-bills was obtained from there. 
Nevertheless, ECB data does not provide for the annual per-member amount of 500 euro-
bills and, therefore, some adjustments were made to get the estimation of that information: 
the total amount of annual 500 euro-bills corresponding to each member state was assessed 
by taking their share on the overall GDP and on total EU population into account: 
 
       
    
     
 
    
     
        
 
Where        stands for the amount of 500-euro bills annually available for each 
member state. 
Mainly for how easily can these 500 euro-bills be manipulated without leaving a trace, it is 
very likely that those embedded with unofficial transactions that do not pay VAT infringe 
more the easier their access to these bills. Therefore, one could expect a positive 
relationship between the amount of 500 euro-bills per country and their VAT Gap; hence, 
a positive relationship between these variables. 
Core hypothesis H6. The more 500 euro-bills available per Member State, the larger its 
VAT Gap, ceteris paribus.  
 
Figure 8. EUR 500 bills – VAT Gap relationship 
 
Source: ECB, own calculations 
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Table 3 summarizes the definition of the variables, the expected sign with respect of their 
relations with the VAT Gap in the European Member States, the hypothesis composed and 
the sources from where data has been obtained. 
 
Table 3. Definition of the variables and hypotheses. 
Definition of the 
variable 
Expected sign Hypotheses Source 
VAT Gap / - TAXUD 
Shadow Economy 
(SE) 
+ 
H1 IMF 
Economic Fiscal 
Decentralization (FD) 
 +/- 
H2.1 IMF and own 
elaboration 
Self-ruled Fiscal 
Decentralization 
(FDSR) 
+/- 
H2.2 IMF and own 
elaboration 
Quality of Government 
(QoG) 
- 
H3 The Quality of 
Government Institute 
Intra-community 
Trade (In_Trade) 
+ 
H4 Eurostat and own 
elaborations 
Standard VAT rates 
(VAT std) 
+ 
H5 European Commission 
Annually available 
amount of 500 euro-
bills (Money) 
+ 
H6 ECB, Eurostat and own 
elaborations 
 
Table 4. shows the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the panel data of the 
econometric model. For each variable, its mean, minimum, and maximum values, the 
standard deviation, and the number of observations are shown. The number of 
observations correspond in all cases to the 28 European Member States and the years 2012 
to 2016. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of variables of the model. 
VARIABLE MEAN MAXIMUM MINIMUM SD OBS 
VAT Gap 0,1530 0,4409 0,0028 0,1050 140 
SE 17,2647 34,6600 7,4100 6,7138 140 
VAT standard 21,4800 27,0000 15,0000 2,4402 140 
QoG 51,9473 87,6591 13,0950 18,9337 140 
Intra IX 0,3004 0,7372 0,0422 0,1948 140 
Intra IM 0,3205 0,6731 0,1159 0,1548 140 
In_Trade 0,6209 1,4103 0,1833 0,3370 140 
FD 0,1799 0,4596 0,0066 0,1180 140 
FDSR 2,0522382 14,831836 0 3,86332753 140 
Money 41858024 224121218 799012 57784053 140 
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5 ECONOMETRIC MODEL AND RESULTS 
5.1 Econometric model 
The goal of this paper is to clear up whether or not shadow economy, different VAT 
standard rates, Quality of Government, Intra-community Trade, Economic Fiscal 
Decentralization, Self-ruled Fiscal Decentralization and the amount of 500 euro-bills 
annually available have an effect on the VAT Gap of European Member States or not, and 
to  estimate to what extent. For this purpose, all regressions carried on include country and 
year fixed effects to the purpose of having estimates reflect the impact of changes in 
explanatory variables within a country over time. The endogenous variable runs from 2012 
to 2016 for the EU-28 Member States. 
Analytically, the basic model to estimate is given by the equation below: 
 
BASIC MODEL (with Self-ruled Fiscal Decentralization): 
                            
   
                       
              
 
Where i indexes the 28-Member States that are to be analyzed, the endogenous variable 
        stands for the difference between the VTTL and the actual VAT revenues as a 
percentage of VTTL.      denotes the country‟s Quality of Government through the 
normalized EQI,     stands for the Shadow Economy,   
    represents the Self-ruled 
Fiscal Decentralization,           is the total intra-community exports and imports all 
together,         is the standard VAT rate for the country,        accounts for the 
number of 500-euro bills that the state has every hear, and finally    denotes the error term 
every of the terms correspond to member i. 
The beta coefficients are the estimates of the impact of the analyzed variables on the 
endogenous variable       . A linear impact is expected from every of the variables, 
namely, independence of the value of the variable. 
 
An alteration will be made to the model changing the variable used to represent Fiscal 
Decentralization, which this time will focus only in the economic perspective of this factor. 
Namely, FD will be used instead of      . Depending on the outcome of the 
representativeness of each of the Fiscal Decentralization variables, a conclusion will be 
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reached on whether or not self-rule conditions the VAT Gap. The other variables will 
remain the same as before. 
 
BASIC MODEL (with Economic Fiscal Decentralization): 
                                                            
     
5.2 Empirical results  
The basic model with the Self-ruled Fiscal Decentralization will be first analyzed. Table 5 
summarizes the movements that have been made to the variables composing this model 
after seeing the results that have arose from previous iterations. Numerical results are 
contained in Table 6. 
If we look at the results for Version 1 of the model, it can be seen that, on the one side and 
consistently with the expectations, the quality of government proxy for Institutional 
Quality (QoG) exerts a significant negative effect on the VAT Gap: whenever the QoG 
increases in one percentage point, the VAT Gap decreases in an estimated average of 
0.002839 percentage points at 1% significance level. On the other side, and also in line with 
the expectations, the variable that measures Self-rule Fiscal Decentralization, – namely  
FDSR – also proves to have a significant negative effect on the dependent variable: whenever 
it increases in one unit, the VAT Gap decreases by approximately 0.004101 points on 
average at a 10% significance level. The last variable that appears to be significant 
according to this model is the variable Money. Whenever the amount of money, which 
stands for the amount of 500 euro-bills that are in circulation each year for each member 
state, increases in 1000 million, increases in one unit the VAT Gap increases in an 
estimated average of 0.317152 percentage points also at a 10% significance level. 
The sign of the remaining variables that have been analyzed in this basic model have also 
shown to be consistent with the hypotheses; nevertheless, this model does not prove a 
significant effect of these variables on the endogenous VAT Gap variable. Concretely, the 
shadow economy, represented by the variable SE; the greater likelihood of missing trade 
fraud, measured by In_Trade; and the changes in the standard VAT rate over the years, 
represented through variable VAT std, are proved to have a positive effect on the VAT 
Gap. Therefore, an increase in any of those variables would result in a consequent increase 
in the VAT Gap. Nevertheless, as stated right before, the results obtained through this 
model do not prove these effects with a relevant significance level. This could be due to the 
fact that these variables aim to measure very complex phenomena that may require more 
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elaborate variables than the ones selected for this model. As the R-squared in this version 
shows, the 38.94% of the variability of the dependent variable is explained by the 
regressors.  
On the path of trying to find which variables are more decisive, the variable standing for 
standard VAT rates was eliminated rates because it did not seem to have a compelling 
effect on variations of the VAT Gap. A potential reason for this result is the fact that 
almost no variability is provided by this variable. Nevertheless, it was worthy to try. 
If we now take a look at Version 2 of the model, which contains the same variables as 
before with the exception of VAT std, which has been removed, only subtle changes can 
be appreciated. The main difference relies on the variable Money, which now exerts a 
greater influence over the dependent variable. Namely for every 1000 million increase in 
the amount of available 500 EUR bill, the VAT Gap increases an estimated average of 
0.646397 percentage points at the same significance level as before, 10%. Although slightly 
improvement was noticed in the t-probability of both SE and In_Trade, were still not 
significant for the model. In this case, the R-squared shows that the 38.74% of the 
variability of the dependent variable is explained by the regressors.  
 A last trial was carried on in order to see whether or not In_Trade variable could gain 
power in a version where SE was removed: Version 3 of the model. This trial was not 
convenient at all because it worsened the results. First of all, no gain of significance was 
achieved for the variable FDSR. In fact, it lost power. Furthermore, Money variable lost its 
significance. Regarding QoG, it gained some power. The R-squared in this version shows, 
the 37.92% of the variability of the dependent variable is explained by the regressors.  
 
Table 5. Movements made to variables of Basic Model (with Self-ruled Fiscal 
Decentralization) 
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Y x x x 
C x x x 
QoG x x x 
SE x x - 
FDSR x x x 
In_Trade x x x 
VAT std x - - 
Money x x x 
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Table 6. Results for Basic Model (with Self-ruled Fiscal Decentralization) 
 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 
Independent variables VAT GAP VAT Gap Vat Gap 
C 0.286598*** 0.234681*** 0.316969*** 
QoG -0.002839*** -0.002772*** -0.003287*** 
SE 0.002092 0.002231 - 
FDSR -0.004101* -0.004271* -0.003206 
In_Trade 0.029460 0.032907 0.011200 
VAT std -0.002002 - - 
Money 0.317152* 0.646397* 0.209789 
R-squared 0.3894 0.3874 0.3792 
***: p-value < 0.01; **: p-value < 0.05; *: p-value < 0.1 
 
After running Basic Model with Self-ruled Fiscal Decentralization within it, the model with 
Economic Fiscal Decentralization was run. The aim of this alteration was to see the effect 
of Economic Fiscal Decentralization on the dependent variable instead of Self-ruled Fiscal 
Decentralization‟s. Hence, one variable was exchanged for the other. The expectations 
were that both variables had a negative effect on the VAT Gap, that is, that higher Fiscal 
Decentralization of any of the two kinds would decrease the gap. Apart from that, 
depending on the results provided by the two models, one could compare them and tell 
whether economic self-rule mattered for the VAT Gap or not. In the same way as with the 
original model, movements made to variables of the alteration are contained on a table, 
namely Table 7, and the numerical results on another one, namely Table 8. 
In the first version of Basic Model with Economic Fiscal Decentralization, limelight goes 
to the same variables as before: QoG, FD, and Money. When economic self-rule is not 
taken into account, the results on how QoG and Money affect the VAT Gap barely suffer 
changes with respect to version 1 of the original model. The impressive change is perceived 
when checking the effects economic Fiscal Decentralization have on the dependent 
variable. In this version, when FD increases in one unit, VAT Gap decreases on an 
estimated average of 0.163953 percentage points with a significance level of 5%. The 
improvement is quite considerable if compared to previous results where the percentage 
increase in VAT Gap for each unit decrease in FDSR was of an estimated average of 
0.004101 and at a 10% significance level. There is an estimated difference of 0.159852. 
Regarding the remaining variables, SE, In_Trade and VAT std remained insignificant for 
the purpose of finding out the factors affecting the amount of VAT Gap. As the R-squared 
in this version shows, the 39.52% of the variability of the dependent variable is explained 
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by the regressors, which is more than the 38.94% explained when Self-ruled Fiscal 
Decentralization was taken into account. 
Next, and for the same reason as before, VAT std was removed from the model and thus, 
the second version of this model configured. This version showed further improvements. 
While no general changes could be noticed in almost any variable, Money gained 
significance. Now, an increase of 1000 million of 500 EUR bills would increase the VAT 
Gap in an estimated average of 0.305976 percentage points at a 5% significance level. The 
other variables appeared to have no changes. As for how much variability of the dependent 
variable is explained by the regressors introduced in this version, it amounts to the 39.52%, 
the same as in the previous version and again more than in the model with Self-ruled Fiscal 
Decentralization. 
Finally, also for the same reason as before, SE variable was removed from the version. This 
way, version 3 of the model was carried on. Results showed that the variable Money lost 
power when SE was taken away from the configuration. An increase of 1000 million of 500 
EUR bills would now increase the VAT Gap in an estimated average of only 0.262511 
percentage points at a 10% significance level, approximately 0.043465 percentage points 
less than before. The other variables appeared to have no changes. The R-squared in this 
version shows a slight decrease on how much variability of the dependent variable is 
explained by the regressors included here, namely the 39.33%. 
 
Table 7 Movements made to variables of Basic Model (with Economic Fiscal 
Decentralization) 
 
VARIABLES MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 
Y x x x 
C x x x 
QoG x x x 
SE x x - 
FD x x x 
In_Trade x x x 
VAT std x - - 
Money x x x 
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Table 8. Results for Basic Model (with Economic Fiscal Decentralization) 
 Version 1 Version 2 Version 3 
Independent variables VAT GAP VAT Gap Vat Gap 
C 0.286112*** 0.288642*** 0.325004*** 
QoG -0.002886*** -0.002890*** -0.003104*** 
SE 0.001009 0.001005 - 
FD -0.163953** -0.162988** -0.164985** 
In_Trade 0.025949 0.025759 0.016557 
VAT std 0.000103 - - 
Money 0.307988* 0.305976** 0.262511* 
R-squared 0.3952 0.3952 0.3933 
***: p-value < 0.01; **: p-value < 0.05; *: p-value < 0.1 
 
In Table 9, the five top and bottom countries and their average values in the most 
significant variables are shown. The ranking is done according to how likely those values 
are to decrease the VAT Gap. Thus, top values correspond to values more likely to be 
linked to lower VAT gaps. In the case of Quality of Government and Fiscal 
Decentralization, that corresponds to larger values whereas in the case of Money 
corresponds to lower values. As can be intuitively seen, European Member States are not 
homogeneous in the variables analyzed in this study; thus, their attention should be focused 
aspects, according to their own circumstances in order to improve their VAT Gap levels. 
From the point of view of the results of this study, countries such as Cyprus and Malta 
have undesirable levels of Economic Fiscal Decentralization whereas their levels of Money 
are the most convenient in order to have a smaller VAT Gap; the example of Spain and 
Germany is the opposite, while having a desirable level of Economic Fiscal 
Decentralization, they has a disadvantageous level of Money. Again, these terms are coined 
taking only their relation with the VAT Gap into account. This evidences that whereas for 
some country efforts should be addressed to improving the level of Economic Fiscal 
Decentralization, for others it should be addressed to control for the level of Money. In the 
case of Quality of Government, countries to which the better values correspond are not 
contained in any of the worse values of the other variables.  
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Table 9. Five top and bottom values for most significant variables. 
QoG FD Money 
TOP FIVE 
Denmark 81,47 Germany  0,449 Malta 854,732 
Finland 80,80 Sweden 0,413 Cyprus 1,747,218 
Sweden 79,71 Spain 0,400 Estonia 2,342,789 
Netherlands 75,81 Finland 0,329 Luxembourg 2,659,446 
Luxembourg 75,49 Belgium 0,286 Latvia 3,291,561 
BOTTOM FIVE 
Hungary 34,30 Slovakia 0,037 Spain 97,672,789 
Croatia 30,84 Greece 0,035 Italy 137,317,566 
Italy 29,44 Ireland 0,030 France 165,468,997 
Romania 16,55 Cyprus 0,019 UK 169,084,567 
Bulgaria 16,04 Malta 0,008 Germany 215,225,553 
Source: own elaboration. 
6. CONCLUSION  
VAT system, as Keen and Lockwood said in 2006, is a “money machine”. It earned this 
name due to how comfortably and easily it raised funds for the public sector. It has 
become essential in today‟s societies which finance their welfare systems through taxes. 
Tthus, well care must to be taken of it. VAT noncompliance is an eminent threat for 
current societies whose capability of supplying public goods and services depends on VAT 
to linger, and as such menace, an effort shall be made to mitigate it. VAT Gap has been 
proved itself useful to represent part of such noncompliance, many times in relative terms 
(as a share of the VTTL); hence the increasing interest for accurately knowing its size and 
determinant factors. To the end of throwing some light at this matter, the European 
Commission tasks a yearly study that, since 2018 also includes an econometric model that 
aims to find out what affect such gap. 
This paper tried to find out whether or not Fiscal Decentralization, institutional quality, the 
amount of 500 EUR bills annually available, the Shadow Economy, the intra-Community 
trade, or the VAT standard rates‟ level of European Member States were relevant factors to 
the VAT Gap or not. The targeted period was from 2012 to 2016. The empirical results 
showed to be in line with the expectations suggested (see Table 3). 
Contributions of this paper are the following. First, Fiscal Decentralization appears to 
decrease the VAT Gap. Both when the economic self-rule is taken into account and when 
it is not. Nevertheless, only when Economic Fiscal Decentralization is taken into account, 
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this decrease is significant. That is, economic self-rule does not make an impact on the 
VAT Gap. In fact, when Fiscal Decentralization takes this aspect into account, its power in 
determining the dependent variable diminished. Therefore, other aspects of fiscal 
decentralization might be more important when it comes to impacting the VAT Gap. 
Second, higher institutional quality is found to negatively affect the VAT Gap in a 
significant way. Its impact remained quite unchanged along the three versions of each of 
the models. Third, the higher the amount of 500 EUR bills annually available was, the 
larger was the increase in the gap other things being equal.  
Sadly, the remaining variables – SE, In_Trade, VAT std –, although in line with the 
expectations proposed, as could be seen in the results did not appear to determine 
significantly the VAT non-compliance in this model. In any case, it is essential to bear in 
mind that had the panel been larger or the information of the variables more complete, the 
results could have been different. 
Apart from that, it has been seen that size of VAT Gaps varies meaningfully across 
European Member States. This must surely have something to do with the considerable 
economic and social differences that characterize each member in the European Union and 
undoubtedly will condition the policies each country chooses to diminish them. A 
harmonized European policy might be inefficient because, optimal policies in order to 
diminish VAT non-compliance would probably be dissimilar one another, depending on 
the just mentioned conditions. As has been shown through Table 9, each Member State has 
its own circumstances and different aspects weaken their ability to fight for a lower VAT 
Gap, what implies that different measures shall be taken in order to improve their frailties.  
In terms of policies, the level of 500 euro bills available annually can be reduced as it has 
been done lately, by decreasing the availability of those bills in favor of smaller ones. This 
way, more bills and space is required to have the same value and it is more difficult to 
manage informally. Another way is to enhance the use of credit cards, which due to the fact 
that they leave a trace, they do not thrill non-compliants. Regarding Quality of 
Government, any policy that improves the different pillars composing this index – the Rule 
of Law, the Government Effectiveness, the Control of Corruption, and Voice & 
Accountability – would improve QoG levels. In countries as in Spain, where the problem 
of corruption is overwhelming, economic resources destined to the improvement of its 
control and punishment, and to education so that the moral cost of being corrupt 
increases, would undoubtedly boost the QoG level and consequently decrease the VAT 
Gap. 
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Finally, although some of the variables analyzed in this study have proved to be 
determinant of the VAT Gap, they have not proved to be totally explicative of the 
dependent variable. Therefore, further research is necessary to assess which are the 
variables that more accurately determine the VAT Gap so that more accurate policies can 
be drawn up to avoid the VAT revenues‟ drain that arises as a consequence of this 
phenomenon.  
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A.1. VAT Gap estimates, 2012 (EUR million) 
Countries Codes 
Revenues VTTL VAT Gap 
VAT Gap 
(%) 
Belgium BE 
26896 29887 2991 10,01% 
Bulgaria BG 
3739 4697 958 20,40% 
Czech Republic CZ 
11377 14644 3267 22,31% 
Denmark DK 
24422 26563 2141 8,06% 
Germany DE 
194040 215997 21957 10,17% 
Estonia EE 
1508 1763 255 14,46% 
Ireland IE 
10219 11482 1263 11,00% 
Greece EL 
13713 20364 6651 32,66% 
Spain ES 
56125 68537 12412 18,11% 
France FR 
142499 168082 25583 15,22% 
Croatia HR 
- - - - 
Italy IT 
95473 141507 46034 32,53% 
Cyprus CY 
- - - - 
Latvia LV 
1570 2389 819 34,28% 
Lithuania LT 
2521 3957 1436 36,29% 
Luxemburg LU 
3064 3268 204 6,24% 
Hungary HU 
9084 12055 2971 24,65% 
Malta MT 
536 777 241 31,02% 
Netherlands NL 
41699 43699 2000 4,58% 
Austria AT 
24563 27807 3244 11,67% 
Poland PL 
27881 37198 9317 25,05% 
Portugal PT 
13995 15223 1228 8,07% 
Romania RO 
11212 20053 8841 44,09% 
Slovenia SI 
2889 3160 271 8,58% 
Slovakia SK 
4328 7114 2786 39,16% 
Finland FI 
17640 18545 905 4,88% 
Sweden SE 
37861 40748 2887 7,09% 
United 
Kingdom 
UK 
142943 159501 16558 10,38% 
Source: TAXUD/2013/CC/321; 
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Shows data on the revenues, the VTTL, and the VAT Gap in million euros and the VAT Gap expressed as a 
percentage of the VTTL for year 2012. 
*VAT Gap (%) stands for the VAT Gap in terms as a share of VTTL. 
TABLE A.2. VAT Gap estimates, 2013 (EUR million) 
Countries Codes 
Revenues VTTL VAT Gap 
VAT Gap 
(%)* 
Belgium BE 
27250 30923 3673 11,88% 
Bulgaria BG 
3898 4653 755 16,23% 
Czech Republic CZ 
11694 14455 2761 19,10% 
Denmark DK 
24321 27409 3088 11,27% 
Germany DE 
197005 221107 24102 10,90% 
Estonia EE 
1558 1826 268 14,67% 
Ireland IE 
10372 11913 1541 12,94% 
Greece EL 
12593 18940 6347 33,51% 
Spain ES 
61126 69589 8463 12,16% 
France FR 
144301 164791 20490 12,43% 
Croatia HR 
- - - - 
Italy IT 
93921 132796 38875 29,27% 
Cyprus CY 
- - - - 
Latvia LV 
1690 2275 584 25,69% 
Lithuania LT 
2611 4253 1642 38,61% 
Luxemburg LU 
3415 3532 116 3,29% 
Hungary HU 
9073 11668 2595 22,24% 
Malta MT 
582 958 375 39,20% 
Netherlands NL 
42424 47731 5307 11,12% 
Austria AT 
24953 27399 2446 8,93% 
Poland PL 
27780 37227 9447 25,38% 
Portugal PT 
13710 16236 2526 15,56% 
Romania RO 
11913 18186 6272 34,49% 
Slovenia SI 
3045 3260 214 6,57% 
Slovakia SK 
4696 6914 2218 32,08% 
Finland FI 
18888 20028 1140 5,69% 
Sweden SE 
39048 39540 492 1,24% 
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United 
Kingdom 
UK 
142227 157932 15705 9,94% 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131;  
Shows data on the revenues, the VTTL, and the VAT Gap in million euros and the VAT Gap expressed as a 
percentage of the VTTL for year 2013. 
*VAT Gap (%) stands for the VAT Gap in terms as a share of VTTL. 
TABLE A.3. VAT Gap estimates, 2014 (EUR million) 
Countries Codes 
Revenues VTTL VAT Gap 
VAT Gap 
(%)* 
Belgium BE 
27518 30496 2978 9,77% 
Bulgaria BG 
3810 4986 1176 23,59% 
Czech Republic CZ 
11602 13916 2313 16,62% 
Denmark DK 
24950 27868 2919 10,47% 
Germany DE 
203081 227979 24898 10,92% 
Estonia EE 
1711 1874 163 8,70% 
Ireland IE 
11521 12628 1106 8,76% 
Greece EL 
12676 16966 4290 25,29% 
Spain ES 
63643 69400 5757 8,30% 
France FR 
148454 170435 21981 12,90% 
Croatia HR 
5368 5611 243 4,33% 
Italy IT 
97071 135376 38305 28,30% 
Cyprus CY 
- - - - 
Latvia LV 
1787 2207 420 19,03% 
Lithuania LT 
2764 3816 1052 27,57% 
Luxemburg LU 
3732 3823 90 2,35% 
Hungary HU 
9754 11757 2003 17,04% 
Malta MT 
642 1063 421 39,60% 
Netherlands NL 
42708 47050 4342 9,23% 
Austria AT 
25386 28084 2699 9,61% 
Poland PL 
29317 39032 9715 24,89% 
Portugal PT 
14682 16914 2232 13,20% 
Romania RO 
11496 20116 8620 42,85% 
Slovenia SI 
3155 3411 256 7,51% 
Slovakia SK 
5021 7227 2206 30,52% 
44 
 
Finland FI 
18948 20159 1211 6,01% 
Sweden SE 
38846 38956 110 0,28% 
United 
Kingdom 
UK 
157478 176193 18715 10,62% 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131; 
*VAT Gap (%) stands for the VAT Gap in terms as a share of VTTL. 
Shows data on the revenues, the VTTL, and the VAT Gap in million euros and the VAT Gap expressed as a 
percentage of the VTTL for year 2014. 
 
 
TABLE A.4. VAT Gap estimates, 2015 (EUR million) 
Countries Codes 
Revenues VTTL VAT Gap 
VAT Gap 
(%)* 
Belgium BE 
27578 30906 3329,00 10,77% 
Bulgaria BG 
4059 5117 1058 20,67% 
Czech Republic CZ 
12382 14903 2521 16,92% 
Denmark DK 
25493 14903 3054 10,70% 
Germany DE 
211616 236322 24706 10,45% 
Estonia EE 
1873 1999 127 6,33% 
Ireland IE 
11955 13375 1419 10,61% 
Greece EL 
12885 18243 5358 29,37% 
Spain ES 
68601 71498 2897 4,05% 
France FR 
151680 171547 19867 11,58% 
Croatia HR 
5690 5941 251 4,22% 
Italy IT 
101061 136814 35753 26,13% 
Cyprus CY 
1517 1690 174 10,28% 
Latvia LV 
1876 2265 389 17,17% 
Lithuania LT 
2888 3880 992 25,57% 
Luxemburg LU 
3442 3523 80 2,28% 
Hungary HU 
10669 12611 1943 15,40% 
Malta MT 
684 708 24 3,42% 
Netherlands NL 
44879 49584 4705 9,49% 
Austria AT 
26247 28529 2282 8,00% 
Poland PL 
30075 39727 9652 24,30% 
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Portugal PT 
15368 17640 2272 12,88% 
Romania RO 
12939 19747 6808 34,48% 
Slovenia SI 
3218 3507 289 8,24% 
Slovakia SK 
5420 7664 2243 29,27% 
Finland FI 
18974 20379 1405 6,89% 
Sweden SE 
40501 41975 1474 3,51% 
United 
Kingdom 
UK 
182152 204752 22600 11,04% 
Source: TAXUD/2015/CC/131;  
*VAT Gap (%) stands for the VAT Gap in terms as a share of VTTL. 
Shows data on the revenues, the VTTL, and the VAT Gap in million euros and the VAT Gap expressed as a 
percentage of the VTTL for year 2015. 
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TABLE A.5. Answers to “justifiable to cheat on taxes if you have the chance”, Wave 5 
Source: World Value Survey 
  
 
Cypr
us 
Fran
ce 
Germ
any 
Hung
ary Italy 
Nethe
rlands 
Pola
nd 
Roma
nia 
Slove
nia 
Spa
in 
Swed
en 
Unite
d 
Kingd
om 
Never 
justifiable 58,5 47,8 55,6 58,9 60,9 60,2 52,2 61,6 54,5 63,8 53,1 56,1 
2 14 14,6 11,7 14,6 10,1 10,7 11,5 9,6 13 10,3 17,7 12,5 
3 9,1 9,7 11,5 10,6 10,1 7 9 4,6 9,4 6,3 11,3 10,3 
4 4,6 4,4 7,5 5,3 4,5 4,7 4,9 2,6 4,7 4,1 4,7 3,1 
5 4,6 9,3 6,1 4,7 5,3 6,6 8,4 4,3 2,9 6,7 5,1 6,5 
6 3,2 3,4 2,7 2,1 3,5 2,9 2,6 1,9 4,7 2,8 2,1 2,4 
7 2,1 1,8 1,2 1,8 1,6 2,5 1,5 2 2,4 3,3 1,6 2,4 
8 0,9 3,6 0,7 0,4 1,4 1,3 2,5 2,2 1,8 0,5 2,1 1,6 
9 0,5 1,4 0,5 0,4 0,4 0,5 1,1 1 1 0,3 0,8 0,8 
Always 
justifiable 2 3,8 0,6 0,4 1,3 2,2 1,3 4,2 1,7 0,3 0,8 1,3 
Missing; Not 
asked by the 
interviewer 0 0 0 0 0 0,1 0 0 0 0 0 0,6 
No answer 0,5 0,2 0,9 0 0,8 0,4 0,1 1,2 1,4 0,4 0,7 1,3 
Don´t know 0 0 0,9 0,7 0,2 0,9 5 4,8 2,4 1,1 0 1 
(N) 1,05 
1,00
1 2,064 1,007 1,012 1,05 1 1,776 1,037 1,2 1,003 1,041 
Mean 2,21 2,83 2,200 2,02 2,18 2,3 2,44 2,34 2,37 2,06 2,25 2,28 
Standard 
Deviation 2,03 2,52 1,79 1,66 1,96 2,16 2,15 2,49 2,18 1,82 1,92 2,05 
Base mean 1,044 999 2,028 1 1,002 1,035 949 1,668 997 
1,18
1 996 1,011 
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TABLE A.6. Answers to “justifiable to cheat on taxes if you have the chance”, Wave 6 
 
Cyprus Estonia Netherlands Poland Romania Slovenia Spain Sweden 
Never 
justifiable 73,4 55,3 62,3 52,9 72,2 70,3 67,6 59,9 
2 7,7 13,3 12,8 13,1 7,1 12,1 12,1 13,3 
3 5,7 10,4 9,4 8,7 4 6,4 7,4 7,6 
4 3,8 5,6 3,7 5,7 2 3 4,4 3,5 
5 3,9 5,3 4,7 7,9 3,9 1,8 5,3 4,8 
6 1,3 2,5 1,8 2,4 1,3 2,7 1,1 2,6 
7 1,1 1,7 0,9 2 1 0,9 0,5 1,8 
8 0,5 1,3 0,6 1,4 1 0,8 0,2 1,1 
9 0,8 1,3 0,2 0,3 1,2 0,1 0 0,5 
Always 
justifiable 0,7 1,3 0,6 1,5 3,9 0,9 0,2 2,1 
Missing; 
Not asked 
by the 
interviewer 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0,2 
No answer 0 0,2 0,7 0,7 0,4 0,4 0,2 0,5 
Don´t 
know 1,1 1,9 2,2 3,4 2,1 0,7 1,1 2,2 
(N) 1 1,533 1,902 966 1,503 1,069 1,189 1,206 
Mean 1,77 2,28 1,9 2,34 2,03 1,76 1,73 2,15 
Standard 
Deviation 1,68 2,02 1,61 2,02 2,28 1,62 1,35 2,04 
Base mean 990 1,501 1,847 926 1,466 1,058 1,174 1,172 
Source: World Value Survey 
